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CONFIDENTIALITY BETWEEN PHYSIIAN
AND PATIENT*
By R IGNAL W. BALDWINt
There is a substantial difference in the strictly legal
aspects of professional confidences in the physican-patient
as against the lawyer-client relationship. However, the
ethics of both the medical and legal professions in this
regard are, and should be, identical. It is the absolute duty
of the physician or surgeon and of the lawyer to preserve
inviolate all confidences reposed in him by the patient
or client - at least until requested by the patient or
client or compelled by legal process to divulge such se-
crets. But the question of the extent to which information
given to either a doctor or a lawyer in confidence should be
permitted to be suppressed by the law, where the public
good or search for truth and justice is involved, is a much
debated field.
As a matter of ethics, it is apparent that ordinarily no
lawyer or doctor should voluntarily disclose facts he has
learned in his professional capacity which conceivably
could be embarrassing to or affect the reputation of his
client or patient. Yet we all know that this basic natural
rule often is violated in club, bar and drawing room con-
versation and in professional contacts. A large propor-
tion of malpractice cases can be traced directly to ill-
considered gossip or criticism of our confreres and com-
petitors.'
Inexcusable as is voluntary disclosure of confidences
for lawyers and physicians and surgeons, it appears that
* Author's Note: This paper was prepared as a talk delivered at the
Medicolegal Symposium of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Mary-
land, April 4, 1962, sponsored by the Symposium Committee of the
Medieolegal Committee of the Baltimore City and Maryland State Bar
Associations and the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland, and,
consequently, is cast in the direction of appeal to physicians and surgeons
rather than as a strictly legal article.
t Of the Maryland Bar; A.B. 1923, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.
1927, University of Maryland.
'Discussed in an address before the Medicolegal Symposium of the
Faculty, April 26, 1961 by G. C. A. Anderson, Esq. of the Baltimore, Md.
Bar, counsel for the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland.
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the client or patient involved has no real redress at law.
Such disclosure is not a crime, and in the only appellate
decision found of a case brought by a patient against a
doctor for voluntary disclosure of secrets learned in the
professional relationship, the patient did not recover.2
Against voluntary disclosure the only relief of the pa-
tient or client is to look elsewhere for a more worthy
guardian of his legal affairs or medical welfare, though
disciplinary action for suspension or even revocation of
the right to practice might well succeed in an aggravated
case.
3
Fortunately it is rare in the practice of most physi-
cians, surgeons or lawyers that they are called upon to
divulge involuntarily information which their patients or
clients wish withheld. Short of legal compulsion, I would
think that the practical reaction by the medical practi-
tioner, and by hospitals also, to requests for such informa-
tion is extremely simple. A written authorization signed
by the patient should be required in every such instance
with the same degree of routine as in respect of consent
to operations.4 Every doctor and hospital should make this
requirement a cardinal and inviolable rule. In fact, up to
the point of having to answer to a validly issued sub-
poena, I do not see how a doctor or a hospital can be
forced to divulge information or records, even if the
patient should both request and authorize disclosure. 5
This statement must except a few particular instances
where medical facts and records are required by law to
be divulged by the physician. Autopsy records are public
documents under a ruling by the Attorney General of
Maryland. 6 The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act' provides
that confidences given to unlawfully procure narcotic
drugs or their administration "shall not be deemed a
privileged communication."8 Physicians are required to re-
2 Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920), where physi-
cian, after warning patient to vacate a hotel, reported to owner that
his "guest" probably was afflicted with a "contagious disease."
8 However, the Maryland Court of Appeals recently recognized "the
right to redress for wrongful invasion of privacy" by unwarranted verbal
disclosure of information which resulted in loss of plaintiff's employment.
Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A. 2d 841 (1962).
' See Consent to Operative Procedures by Kenneth C. Proctor, Esq. of the
Towson, Md. Bar. Infra, p. 190 et seq.
5 At least as to permitting unoflcial inspection or use of case histories.
Securing routine authority to use records for intra-hospital or research
purposes might be desirable.
624 Op. Atty. Gen., 650 (1939).
'3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 276 et seq.
83 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 295(b).
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port certain communicable9 and occupational ° diseases to
the local health officer. They must fill out and file birth
and death certificates." Also they may be guilty of a
criminal act if they clandestinely treat cases such as
gunshot, stab or other similar wounds, attempted suicides,
or abortions, without notifying the authorities. 2
We come now to consideration of the circumstances
under which conditions observed by and confidences given
to a physician or surgeon may be compelled to be divulged.
Here exists the difference between the legal and medical
profession.
Early at common law there appeared a general privilege
of confidentiality invokable by any witness in a lawsuit
based on his conception of "honor among gentlemen".
This was quaintly illustrated in Lord Grey's Trial, a 1682
British criminal case.13 The charge was for abducting and
debauching Lady Henrietta Berkeley. Lady Henrietta
testified for the defendants that she left her parents' house
voluntarily. Asked who was with her, she replied, "I shall
not give any account of that, for I will not betray any-
body for their kindness to me.' '14
But such personal privilege did not prevail in the de-
velopment of the common law, and finally the English
courts upheld the privilege of confidentiality only in the
lawyer-client and husband-wife relationships. 5  The
former is based in part on the fact that, unlike the doctor-
patient relationship, the lawyer and his client must look
toward an ultimate court proceeding, and it is felt the
client should not be curtailed in his freedom to make frank
9 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, §§ 56 and 78 require written notice to local
health officer of deaths due to, and of living cases of contagious or
infectious diseases dangerous to public health.
'0To State Board of Health. 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, § 11.
14 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, 9H 18 and 20. The State Board of Health
may "furnish any applicant for proper purposes a certified copy." § 26.
Penalty for unlawful communication in respect of information. § 28(c).
§ 27 provides that "certified copies of such certificates, shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
"There appears to be no State statute on this. Dr. Russell S. Fisher,
Chief Medical Examiner for the 'State of Maryland, states there are
applicable local laws in some counties. However, It is submitted that a
physician or surgeon should report to the police all cases which appear
to involve serious criminal acts and incurs great risk in not doing so.
Is9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682).
Id., 175.
25In Maryland statutory privilege has been accorded to: (1) journalists
as to source of news (4 Mo. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 2); (2) public ac-
countants (7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75A, § 11); and (3) clergymen and
priests (7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 13). The American Bar Association
Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence voted over-
whelmingly against so-called "novel privileges" (1) and (2) above; 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaghten Rev. ed. 1961) § 2286, pp. 536-7.
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disclosure of adverse facts by the specter of his lawyer
being compelled later to divulge adverse facts disclosed in
confidence. As to husband and wife, the basis was and is
to protect and encourage domestic tranquility. In other
words a general public good was considered as being served
in only these two relationships by affording a privilege of
absolute confidentiality.
The leading early British case in which a patient was
not privileged to require confidentiality as to facts im-
parted to his physician was the Duchess of Kingston's
Trial.16 The charge was bigamy. Mr. Hawkins, a physician
who attended the accused and her alleged husband, when
asked whether he knew from the parties of any marriage
between them, replied "I do not know how far anything
that has come before me in a confidential trust in my
profession should be disclosed, consistent with my pro-
fessional honour."'17 To this Lord Chief Justice Mansfield
replied:
"[I]f all your lordships will acquiesce, Mr. Hawkins
will understand, that it is your judgment and opinion,
that a surgeon has no privilege, where it is a material
question, in a civil or criminal cause, to know whether
parties were married, or whether a child was born,
to say that his introduction to the parties was in the
course of his profession, and in that way he came to the
knowledge of it. * * * If a surgeon was voluntarily
to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty
of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but
to give that information in a court of justice, which
by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be
imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever."' 8
This doctrine ever since has been accepted by the
British courts. Professor Wigmore states that it probably
would have been acknowledged as a common law princi-
ple in every American court had not New York adopted in
1828 a statutory innovation establishing a privilege be-
tween physician and patient, which, to a greater or less
extent, has been since enacted in about two-thirds of the
states. 19
Our Maryland courts have adhered to the common law20
and the General Assembly has made no statutory change.
"20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776).17Id., 572.
- Id., 573.
" WIGiORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961), § 2380, p. 819.
S'Benzinger v. Hemler, 134 Md. 581, 583, 107 A. 355 (1919); O'Brien
v. State, 126 Md. 270, 284, 94 A. 1034 (1915), where the Court of Appeals
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A recent federal decision recognized the Maryland law
in this respect.21
The leading authorities on the law of evidence draw a
sharp line between the reasons for the lawyer-client privi-
lege as against a similar physician-patient privilege. Pro-
fessor Edmund Morgan, author of the American Bar Asso-
ciation & American Law Institute 1961 treatise for basic
study of evidence, has said: "[T]he existence of the
lawyer-client privilege can be the basis of no sound argu-
ment for the creation of a privilege covering communica-
tions between physician and patient. '2
However, many members of the medical profession
quite naturally take the view that there is as much reason
for confidentiality in their relationship with patients as
in the case of lawyer and client, if not more. The result
has been that the legislatures of about thirty five states
have been persuaded to enact statutes giving such privilege
in varying degrees in relationships involving professional
medical or surgical attention. The results of such legis-
lation are chaotic in that there is great conflict in the
decisions under the variegated privilege statutes. In New
York the statute is twelve lines long and in 1942 it took
eight pages of small type just to summarize the judicial
decisions interpreting these lines.23 In four states without
general physician-patient statutes, psychologists success-
fully lobbied passage of such a statute for their clients.24
In others psychiatrists only have secured the right to have
their patients seal their lips. Cases have arisen as to
whether dentists,25 internes, nurses, osteopaths, chiro-
practors, Christian Science practitioners, phychologists,
hospital attendants, druggists and veterinaries are within
the coverage of general physician-patient privilege stat-
utes.2
6
said, "Communications made to medical men in their professional capacity
were not at common law privileged and they have not been made so by
statute in this State."
"Chief Judge Thomsen, U.S. District Court for Md., in Leszynski v.
Russ, 29 F.R.D. 19 (1961).
Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by
Rules of Evidence, 10 U. of Chi. Law Rev. 285, 290 (1943).
Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 Yale L.J. 607,
616, n. 42. See also CLEVENGER'S, ANNUAL PRAcTICE OF NEW YORK (1961).
248 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961), § 2286, n. 23,§ 2382, n. 5. Georgia affords privilege in psychologist-client and psychi-
atrist-patient relationships only.
25The N.Y. statute, N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 352, includes dentists and nurses.
Wigmore states such statutes "should include a dentist," but the cases
exclude where not specifically covered. WIOMORB, op. cit. supra, n. 24,
§ 2382.
20 Generally patients of "licensed practitioners" of medicine are covered.
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 24, § 2382.
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The most important fact in connection with this entire
subject, generally not understood, is that such privilege,
whether at common law or by statute, is solely the privi-
lege of the patient or client27 and not that of the lawyer,
physician or surgeon. Unless the client or patient forbids,
the lawyer or doctor under court compulsion must testify.
It is difficult therefore to see how this issue was raised in
a case involving a veterinarian 28 but so it was even though
the patient was a horse named "Bravo". In addition, to
being equine rather than human, unhappily he was also
dead at the time, and so could not have asserted such a
privilege anyway! This leads me to add here that a corpse
ordinarily is held not entitled to the statutory privilege
since the physician making an autopsy is not a "treating
physician. '"29
The outstanding authorities on the law of evidence
are unanimous against any extension of such a privilege,"
and I wholeheartedly agree with them. Some even hold
that the lawyer-client relationship justifies privilege no
more than that of patient and physician and should be cur-
tailed.3' The basis of this viewpoint is the giving of first
consideration to public interest or the welfare of the com-
munity as a whole, as against that of the individual client
or patient, doctor or lawyer. Again, it must be understood
that the privilege is that of the individual patient or
client - not that of the doctor or lawyer - and what is
good and proper for him must be balanced against the
public good and the prevailing requirements of justice.
The legal writers feel, and I agree, that such a privilege
can too often be used more as a sword than as a shield.
What is a lawsuit for? It is to lay bare the relevant
facts so as to arrive at the truth and thereby accomplish
justice. What is such a privilege for? It is to suppress
Including his executor, administrator or heir, who ordinarily may
waive it. WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 24, §§ 2391 and 2386.
2 Hendershott v. Western Union Tel. 0o., 106 Iowa 529, 76 N.W. 828
(1898).
WIGMORE, OP. cit. supra, n. 24, § 2382, p. 841 and cases cited in n. 11
therein. It is contra where autopsy physician had treated deceased when
alive.
108 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (MeNaughton Rev. ed. 1961) § 2380(a). Ap-
parently subscribed to by Professor John T. McNaughton, Harvard Law
School, revisor of the extraordinarily excellent 1961 ed. of Vol. 8. Chafee,
op. cit. supra, n. 23, 616. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to
Eopert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. of Chi. Law Rev. 285, 289
(1943).
$'Professor Morgan strongly maintains that the lawyer-client privilege
also is an inducement to dishonesty and fraud, op. cit. supra, n. 30,
287-290. See also WioMouE, op. cit. supra, n. 30, §§ 2291 and 2380a, p. 830;
Chafee, op. cit. supra, n. 23, 609.
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facts and the ascertainment of the truth for personal
reasons, and often thereby to suppress justice.
Take a simple example - a damage suit for alleged
personal injuries where the first treating physician found
no injury. By claiming statutory privilege the plaintiff
may completely deny the defendant the right to call the
first physician as a witness, while producing others to
whom he later reported grievous injuries.
The late Professor Wigmore, of Harvard, pre-eminent
author and authority, states in his monumental work on
evidence:
"[T]he piactical employment of the privilege has
come to mean little but the suppression of useful truth
- truth which ought to be disclosed * * *. Ninety-
nine per cent of the litigation in which the privilege
is invoked consists of three classes of cases - actions
on policies of life insurance where the deceased's mis-
representations of his health are involved, actions for
corporal injuries where the extent of the plaintiff's
injury is at issue, and testamentary actions where the
testator's mental capacity is disputed. In all of these
the medical testimony is absolutely needed for the
purpose of learning the truth. In none of them is there
any reason for the party to conceal the facts, except as
a tactical maneuver in litigation. * * *
"There is little to be said in favor of the privilege,
and a great deal to be said against it. The adoption of
it in any other jurisdiction is earnestly to be depre-
cated. '32
Another eminent authority, Professor Zechariah Cha-
fee, Jr. stated:
"Some doctors may feel that it is an unfair dis-
crimination against their profession if lawyers' secrets
are protected from disclosure in court and yet physi-
cians' secrets must be laid bare. Perhaps lawyers as
well as doctors should be forced to divulge information
when the judge thinks disclosure essential to the
public interest, and proposals are now under con-
sideration for extensive modifications of the attorney-
and-client privilege. However, the success or failure
of these proposals ought not to affect the question
whether medical secrets should be inviolable in
court. The relation between lawyer and client does
8 WI Mom, op. cit. supra, n. 30, § 2380a, p. 831.
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differ materially from the relation between doctor and
patient, and each privilege should be judged on its
own merits. The administration of justice ought not to
be shaped by inter-professional jealousies and trivial
claims to prestige. Indeed, we can all agree that it is
a misfortune when a lawsuit is won by the party who
would lose it if all the facts were known, and that
we increase the risk of such a miscarriage of justice
whenever we allow an important witness to keep any
helpful facts away from the judge and jury. Secrecy
in court is prima facie calamitous, and it is permissible
only when we are very sure that frankness will do
more harm than good. With doctors' secrets as with
any other kind of secrets, the only proper test is the
welfare of the community. Courtroom secrecy in the
particular case must produce a public good which
more than offsets the risks resulting from concealment
of truth and from the lies which can be made with less
fear of detection. If the doctor-patient privilege
should prove to be socially undesirable, the doctors,
possessing a high professional sense of public welfare,
should be among the first to oppose it. '33
Among the reasons usually advanced for extending the
privilege of silence to the medical profession is that if a
patient knows his confidences may be divulged in future
litigation, he will hesitate to obtain needed medical aid.
As to this, Professor Morgan has said:
"Have the physically afflicted shunned the famous
physicians and surgeons of Baltimore because Mary-
land denies any such privilege? No one has the
temerity to assert that progress in medical science in
England, in Maryland, in Massachusetts has been
deterred in the slightest degree by their adherence to
the common law rule, or that the development of the
science and art of healing has been advanced in any
measure in any state by the presence of the privilege.
In short, there is nothing to demonstrate any benefit
to the public in the privilege, while the law books are
full of instances where its application has prevented
the discovery of the truth to the damage of honest
litigants. ' 34
" Chafee, op. cit. supra, n. 23,. 608-9.
"Chafee, op. cit. supra, n. 23, 09-10; Morgan, op. cit. supra, n. 30, 291,
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The principal pressure for enactment of a statutory
privilege appears to come from the psychiatrists and
psychologists. In fact a Bill proposing legal privilege of
communications between psychiatrists and their patients
in Maryland has been prepared for introduction at the
1963 session of the General Assembly. 5 While there may
be some reason to separate psychiatrists36 as a class from
surgeons and some specialists, how can they - or rather
their patients - logically be singled out for special con-
sideration as against patients of the family physician of
the "old school" or the country doctor, who learns all of
the secrets of the entire family?3 7 I, for one, emphatically
would not change the law toward any such extension
of legal privilege but, rather, toward restriction of all
existing privileges which tend to suppress truth and
justice.
The conclusion that may be drawn is that doctors and
lawyers must be especially alert not to disclose voluntarily
information they have observed or have been told in con-
fidence by patients and clients - unless obtaining express
written consent; that is, usually, not until and unless re-
quired to do so in Court. In short, that each should strictly
observe the high ethics of his respective profession in all
matters of confidentiality just as far as permitted to do so
by law. As Lord Mansfield said in the revered year 1776:
"If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these se-
crets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of
honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that in-
formation in a court of justice, which by the law of the
land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him
as any indiscretion whatever."38
Item 117 before the 1961 Legislative Council, according tlo Dr. Carl
Everstine, Chief, Bureau of Legislative Reference.
wA persuasive case is made for this exception in "Psychiatry and The
Law" (Norton, 1952), by Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher, Psychiatrist to the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore, and Professor Henry Weihofen, Univ. of
N.M. Law School. See Ch. 12, "The Patient's Privilege of Silence."
By a 2-1 vote, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia sus-
tained objection to entering Into evidence a hospital record containing the
opinion of an attending psychiatrist. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
147 F. 2d 297 (1945). However, in "Basie Problems of Evidence," pub-
lished by the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, (Vol. 2
(1961) 313), Professor Morgan states "this decision has been subject
to criticism, judicial and otherwise, and is contrary to the ruling of the
New York Court of Appeals," citing Buckminster's Estate v. Commis-
sioner of Int. Rev., 147 F. 2d 331, (2nd Cir. 1944) ; People v. Kohlmeyer,
284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E. 2d 490 (1940) ; 59 Harv. L. Rev. 563-65 (1946) ; 54
Yale L.J. 868, 876 (1945).
1Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (1776).
